Building on Eaton and Kortum's (2002) model of Ricardian trade, Alvarez and Lucas (2005) calculate that a small country representing 1% of the world's GDP experiences a gain of 41% as it goes from autarky to frictionless trade with the rest of the world. But the gains from openness, which includes not only trade but all the other ways through which countries interact, are arguably much higher than the gains from trade. This paper presents and then calibrates a model where countries interact through trade as well as di¤usion of ideas, and then quanti…es the overall gains from openness and the role of trade in generating these gains. Having the model match the trade data (i.e., the gravity equation) and the observed growth rate is critical for this quanti…cation to be reasonable. The main result of the paper is that, compared to the model without di¤usion, the gains from openness are much larger (206% 240%) and the gains from trade are smaller (13% 24%) when di¤usion is included in the model. This last result is a consequence of a novel feature of the model, namely that trade and di¤usion are substitutes, implying that trade generates smaller gains when di¤usion is present.
Introduction
How much does a country gain from its relationship with the rest of the world? Consider for example the recent work by Alvarez and Lucas (2005) , who build on Eaton and Kortum's (2002) model of Ricardian trade. According to their quantitative model, a small country like Argentina, which represents approximately 1% of the world's GDP, experiences an income gain of 41% as it goes from autarky to frictionless trade with the rest of the world. But the gains from openness, which includes not only trade but all the other ways through which countries interact, are arguably much higher than the gains from trade. Even if a country were to shut down trade, it could still bene…t from foreign ideas through foreign direct investment (FDI), migration, books, journals, the Internet, etc.
The goal of this paper is to construct and calibrate a model where countries interact through trade and di¤usion of ideas, and then to quantify the overall gains from openness and the role of trade in generating these gains. The main result is that the gains from trade are smaller than those quanti…ed by Alvarez and Lucas (between 13% and 24% rather than 41% for a country with 1% of the world's GDP) whereas the gains from openness are relatively large (between 206% and 240% for a country with 1% fo the world's GDP). An implication is that shutting down trade would generate loses that are quite small in comparison to the loses that would arise if the country were to become completely isolated by shutting down both trade and di¤usion.
Calculating the gains from trade in a model that allows for trade and di¤usion represents a signi…cant departure from the standard practice in the literature, which is to consider trade as the only means through which countries interact. This alternative approach has at least two advantages. First, having both trade and di¤usion in the model shows that the gains from trade depend on the way in which trade and di¤usion interact. In the model I present here, trade and di¤usion are (imperfect) substitutes: if a country cannot import a good then it may adopt a foreign technology for domestic production, and if a country cannot use a foreign technology then it may import the goods produced abroad with that technology.
1 Since trade and di¤usion are substitutes, then shutting down trade in this model leads to smaller losses than in models with no di¤usion such as Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2005) .
A second advantage from studying di¤usion and trade together is that one can compare the gains from trade with the overall gains from openness, and this may provide a way to judge whether the numbers are reasonable. The usual reaction of economists to the calculated gains from trade in quantitative models is that they are "too small." Apparently, economists have a prior belief that these gains are much higher, so there has been a search for mechanisms through which trade can have a larger e¤ect, such as scale e¤ects, intra-industry reallocations or gains from increased variety. But the result of this search has generally been disappointing (see Tybout, 2003) . This paper suggests that the reason for this may be that the gains from trade are in fact "small," while economists'priors about large gains may in fact be about the overall gains from openness. More importantly, this strategy may have relevant implications for research and policy regarding how countries integrate with the rest of the world. In particular, the result of this paper that the gains from trade appear to be quite small relative to the overall gains from openness suggests that both research and policy should at least partially redirect their attention from trade to all the other ways through which countries interact. More attention should be devoted, for example, to understanding the importance of FDI and migration in the international exchange of ideas, and to think about policies that countries can follow to speed up the adoption of foreign technologies.
In Eaton and Kortum's (2002) model of Ricardian trade with no di¤usion, countries gain from openness through specialization according to comparative advantage. In the model I construct here, countries also gain from di¤usion of ideas. Both the gains from trade and the gains from di¤usion come from the same basic phenomenon, namely the sharing of the best ideas across countries. Consider, for example, Japan's superior technology for producing automobiles. This technology can be shared through trade by having Japan export automobiles or through di¤usion by having other countries produce their own automobiles using Japan's technology. In both cases, thanks to the non-rivalry of ideas emphasized by Romer (1990) , sharing ideas leads to an increase in worldwide income.
These gains from sharing the best ideas are the same ones that give rise to aggregate increasing returns to scale in models of quasi-endogenous growth such as Jones (1995) and Kortum (1997) . Consider Kortum (1997) . In the simplest version of this model, the arrival of new ideas is proportional to the population level and the quality of each idea is drawn from an unchanging distribution. The technology frontier at a certain point in time is the set of best ideas available to produce the given set of goods, and the average productivity of the technology frontier determines the income per capita level. A larger economy has more ideas, more ideas imply that the best available technologies are more productive, and this allows the economy to sustain a higher income level. This entails a scale e¤ect in levels so that income per capita y is increasing with population L, y = L , where and are positive constants. Jared
Diamond's main argument in his book Guns, Germs and Steel can be interpreted as saying that this scale e¤ect from sharing ideas is what allowed large "Eurasia" to attain a superior level of productivity (Diamond, 1997) . For the present purposes, the relevant implication is that a country can achieve a level of income that is much lower in isolation than sharing ideas in a world of six billion people.
A scale e¤ect of the kind just described is the key element in quasi-endogenous growth models, as it implies that the growth rate is proportional to the growth rate of population, g = g L . This implication allows for a simple calibration, which reveals the magnitude of the gains from openness (in steady state levels). With g = 1:5% and g L = 4:8%, 2 the equation g = g L implies that = 0:31, which in turn implies that a country with 1% of the world's population enjoys gains from openness equal to 320% (100 0:31 = 4: 2).
To explore the role of trade, it is necessary to have a model that is quantitatively consistent with both the observed growth rate and the observed trade volumes. Matching the observed growth rate is essential, since -as shown above -this is what pins down the gains from openness.
I build on Eaton and Kortum's (2001) model of trade and growth, which can be seen as an extension of Kortum (1997) to incorporate trade. A key parameter in this model, , determines the variability of the distribution of the quality of ideas. 3 If is calibrated to match the gravity equation, as is done in Eaton and Kortum (2002) , then a puzzle emerges in that the implied growth rate is almost an order of magnitude lower than the one we observe for the OECD countries in the last decades. Alternatively, if is calibrated to match the observed rate of growth in the OECD, then the model generates too much trade, since the pattern of comparative advantage is too strong and dominates the estimated trade costs.
2 The rate of growth of y is the rate of growth of income per worker after subtracting the contribution from increases in average human capital and in the capital-output ratio (see Jones, 2002, and Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 2005) . The value for g L comes from the rate of growth of researchers in the G5 countries (West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan) from 1950 to 1993, see Jones (2002) . Note that this is signi…cantly higher than the 1:1% rate of growth of population observed in the OECD in the last decades because of an increasing share of the population devoted to research. Doing this exercise with a lower g L would lead to even larger gains from openness.
There are (at least) two ways to deal with this puzzle: …rst, by allowing for di¤usion of ideas across countries, and second, by allowing for knowledge spillovers as a way to accelerate the rate of growth of ideas. 4 In this paper I focus on di¤usion because my main goal is to explore the implications of this phenomenon for the gains from openness. 5 To understand why di¤usion may allow the model to match both the gravity equation and the growth rate, note that the excessive volume of trade generated by the high needed to match growth of 1:5% per year is dampened when countries can share ideas through di¤usion rather than trade. Introducing di¤usion into the model leads to a gravity equation with a discontinuous border e¤ect (i.e., trade falls discontinously as trade costs increase from zero) that is not present in Kortum (2001, 2002) . Estimating from this equation leads to = 0:22 rather than Eaton and Kortum's = 0:12, and this helps to increase the model's implied growth rate from g = 0:29% to g = 0:53%. But this is still signi…cantly below the observed g = 1:5%.
To increase the model's implied growth rate without a¤ecting its trade implications, I allow for progress and di¤usion in ideas that are relevant for non-tradable goods. I refer to these ideas as "NT ideas" to di¤erentiate them from the ideas associated with tradable goods, which I will call "T ideas." Analogously to the role played by for T ideas, a parameter determines the variability of the distribution of the quality of NT ideas. One can then use = 0:22 to match the gravity equation, and = 0:2 so that the model generates g = 1:5%. 6 Having this model that is quantitatively consistent with observed growth and trade volumes, I can then calculate the gains from openness and the role of trade in these gains. The main result is as stated above: the gains from openness are large (206% 240%), while the gains from trade are in fact smaller than in the model without di¤usion (13% 24% rather than 41%).
7
This paper is related to the literature on trade and endogenous growth associated with Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) , among others. This group of papers showed that trade or international knowledge spillovers could lead to a higher growth rate thanks to the exploitation of scale economies in R&D at the global level. This is essentially what Jones (1995) called a "strong scale e¤ect," whereby larger markets exhibit higher growth 4 I thank Sam Kortum for suggesting knowledge spillovers as a way to deal with this puzzle. 5 In a previous version of this paper I explored a model with knowledge spillovers and calculated the corresponding gains from openness and the role of trade. The results are very similar to the ones I present below.
6 In the calibrated model the growth rate is g = ( =2 + )g L . Thus, = 0:22 and = 0:2 together with g L = 4:8% imply g = 1:5%.
7 These gains from openness di¤er from the ones calculated above for the simple calibration to observed growth (i.e., 320%) because the model developed in the paper and its calibration incorporate frictions in the di¤usion process that lower the gains from openness.
rates. Jones'empirical analysis showed that such a strong scale e¤ect is not consistent with the data, however, so there has been a shift towards quasi-endogenous growth models, where the growth rate is not a¤ected by scale variables. In this paper I focus on this class of models and explore the quantitative implications of openness on steady state income levels.
Another related literature is the one that focuses on international technology di¤usion. The closest paper is by Eaton and Kortum (1999) , who develop and calibrate a model of technology di¤usion and growth among the …ve leading research economies. These authors then perform a counterfactual analysis to see the implications for the U.S. of detaching itself from sharing ideas with the rest of the world. Using the quasi-endogenous growth model due to Jones (1995) , Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (2005) performed a similar exercise and found enormous gains from openness for small countries. This paper can be seen as an extension of this literature to include trade into the model and thereby quantify the gains from openness arising from both trade and di¤usion.
Finally, Coe and Helpman (1995) , Keller (1998) and others reviewed in Keller (2004) study the role of trade as a vehicle for "international R&D spillovers." The idea is that by importing intermediate and capital goods, a country bene…ts from the R&D done in the exporting countries. This is a key feature of the model of R&D and trade in Eaton and Kortum (2001) as well as the model I present in this paper. But here such R&D spillovers are interpreted as gains from trade, whereas technology di¤usion is a term reserved for the more narrow concept of information ‡ows that allow countries to directly use technologies created elsewhere. In other words, the gains from international R&D spillovers in Coe and Helpman (1995) are here simply measured as gains from trade. A di¤erent notion is that trade accelerates the international ‡ow of technical know-how (see Grossman and Helpman, p. 165) . Several papers have explored this empirically with mixed results (see Rhee et. al., 1984 , Aitken et. al., 1997 , and Clerides et. al., 1998 , and Bernard and Jensen, 1999 . This phenomenon is not captured in the model presented below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I lay out the basic model with T ideas and no di¤usion to introduce the basic notation and assumptions, and to establish a benchmark against which to compare the results of the full model. In this section I also show that if is calibrated to match trade volumes then the implied growth rate is too low. In Section 3 I present the full model, which entails both technological progress in the production of non-tradables through the introduction of NT ideas, and di¤usion for both T ideas and NT ideas. In this Section I derive analytical results for the gains from openness and the gains from trade. I establish the result discussed above that trade and di¤usion are subsitutes, and show that this implies that the gains from trade are lower than in a model with no di¤usion. In section 4 I calibrate the model to match trade volumes and the observed growth rate, and in Section 5 I use the calibrated model to quantify the gains from openness and the role of trade.
The …nal section o¤ers concluding comments and topics for future research.
Trade and growth without di¤usion
In this section I …rst present a model of trade and growth without di¤usion based on Eaton and Kortum (2001) .
8 I then calibrate an enriched version of the model to compute the gains from trade and the implied growth rate.
A model of trade and growth
There is a single factor of production, labor, I countries indexed by i, and a continuum of In particular, let the cost of producing such a good be given by x(u) w, where w is the wage level. Note that the parameter , which will be constant across goods and countries, magni…es the variability of the cost parameter x on the actual cost structure across goods and countries.
This parameter will be crucial in the analysis that follows.
At any point in time the cost parameters x(u) are the result of previous research e¤orts in each country. Following Kortum (1997) and Eaton and Kortum (2001) Ideas for producing a particular intermediate good di¤er only in terms of a "quality" parameter, and the economy's productivity for intermediate good u is determined by the best idea available for the production of this good. The quality of ideas is independently drawn from a distribution of quality which is assumed to be Pareto with support in [1; 1] and parameter one. 9;10 Letting x(u) be the inverse of the quality of the best idea that has arrived up to time t for good u, then it is easy to show that x(u) is distributed exponentially with parameter .
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Transportation costs are of the iceberg type, with one unit of a good shipped from country j resulting in k ij 1 units arriving in country i. I assume that k ii = 1, that k ij = k ji , and that the triangular inequality holds (i.e., k ij k ik k kj for all i; j; k).
9 Kortum (1997) shows that the Pareto assumption for the distribution of quality is necessary for there to be a steady state growth path. 10 Eaton and Kortum (2001) assume that the distribution of quality is Pareto with parameter , whereas here I assume instead a Pareto distribution with parameter 1, with being a parameter that expands the di¤erences in cost across ideas, as in Alvarez and Lucas (2005) . The two approaches are equivalent except that the here is the inverse of Eaton and Kortum's . 11 Letting q represent the quality of ideas, then Pr(Q q) = H(q) = 1 1=q. Letting v be the quality of the best idea that has arrived up to time t, then using e
=v , and hence x 1=v exp( ). There is a discrepancy in that here v 1 (because q 1) whereas the exponential distribution has range in [0; 1[. As shown by Kortum (1997) , this can be safely ignored because quality levels below one become irrelevant as gets large.
Equilibrium
Following Alvarez and Lucas (2005) , I relabel goods by x (x 1 ; x 2 :::x I ) rather than u. The price of good x in country i is then 
Letting p mi be the price index of the …nal good, then p
dF (x) and assuming 1 + (1 ) > 0; 13 we get
where
, with () being the Gamma function.
To determine wages we introduce the trade-balance conditions. As shown by Eaton and Kortum (2002) , the average price charged by any country j in any country i is the same, and hence the share of total income in country i spent on imports from country j, D ij , is equal to the share of goods for which country j is the lowest cost supplier in country i. In turn, this share is equal to the probability that (w j =k ij )x j = min l f(w l =k il )x l g. From the properties of the exponential distribution, this probability is D ij ij = i . Given that total income in country i is L i w i , then the trade balance conditions are simply
The previous conditions determine a competitive equilibrium. In particular, a competitive equilibrium is a couple of vectors p m = (p m1 ; p m2 ; :::; p mI ) and w = (w 1 ; w 2 ; :::; w I ) such that, together with the vector ( 1 ; 2 ; :::; I ) that satis…es equations (1) and (2) and D ij ij = i , the trade balance conditions (3) are satis…ed.
12 These properties are: (1) if x exp( ) and k > 0 then kx exp( =k); and (2) if x and y are independent, x exp( ) and y exp( ), then minfx; yg exp( + ).
13 The assumption that 1 + (1 ) > 0 entails < 1 + 1= . In principle, I could explore whether this inequality holds given estimates of and given the values of that I will discuss in the text below. In practice, however, the empirical value of depends on the level of aggregation that we use for inputs, which in turn should be determined by the level at which technologies di¤er in the way speci…ed in the model. Thus, the restriction 1 + (1 ) > 0 must be taken as an assumption for now.
Growth and the gains from trade
I now turn to the implications of the model for growth and the gains from trade. Once we choose a numeraire, wages are constant in steady state since all i are growing at the same rate g L . The growth rate in real wages is then given by the rate of decline in p mi . But from (2) it is clear that p mi falls at rate g L , so the growth rate of real wages or consumption is
This is a simple version of Kortum (1997) . Note in particular that growth of income per capita depends on the growth rate of population (the hallmark of quasi-endogenous growth models)
and that a higher implies a higher growth rate. The reason for this positive role of is that a high magni…es the bene…t of high-quality ideas and this is the mechanism that fuels growth in this model. 
. Similarly, with frictionless trade we have
. With i = then it is easy to show that there is factor price equalization (i.e., w i = w j for all i; j), and hence the gains from trade are simply
Since they generate a smaller share of the world's best ideas, smaller economies have more to gain from integrating with the rest of the world. Moreover, a high leads to higher gains from trade. As explained in the Introduction, the reason for this is that a high increases the variability of cost di¤erences across countries and hence leads to a stronger pattern of comparative advantage.
Towards a quantitative model
I now enrich and calibrate the model to explore its quantitative implications. There are two modi…cations. First, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2005) These modi…cations do not substantially a¤ect the qualitative results above; the only difference is that now the wage w i must be substituted by the unit cost of the input bundle, c i , in the de…nition of ij in equation (1). 14 But there are important quantitative implications. In particular, the growth rate is now
If intermediate goods have a high share in the production of intermediate goods (i.e., high 1 ), 14 As shown by Alvarez and Lucas (2005) , the trade balance conditions are not a¤ected by the values of or (at least for the case in which there are no tari¤s, as here). 
Goods,
so that there is a large multiplier 1= , then the growth rate will be higher. Similarly, the growth rate increases with the share of intermediate goods in the production of the consumption good (i.e., 1
). The term 1 also a¤ects the gains from trade, which in the case of i = considered above are
The key parameters of the model are , , , and g L . Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
Taking logs, and letting m ij ln(D ij =D jj ) and ij = ln(p mj =p mi k ij ), then
Eaton and Kortum (2002) construct m ij from 1990 data on trade and production of manufactures for 19 OECD countries and ij from data on prices from the UN ICP 1990 benchmark study, which gives retail prices for 50 manufactured products in these countries. 15 An OLS regression with no intercept (as required by theory) yields = 0:12.
16 Alvarez and Lucas (2005) calibrate the parameters and to match the fraction of U.S. employment in the non-tradables sector and the share of labor in the total value of tradables produced, respectively. They …nd = 0:75 and = 0:5. For g L I could use the growth rate of population in the OECD over the last decades, which is g L = 1:1%. But as Jones (2002) has emphasized, there has been an upward trend in the share of people devoted to R&D in rich countries over the last decades. According to Jones, the rate of growth of researchers has been 4:8% over the period 1950-1993 in the G-5 countries. 17 Plugging these values in equation (5) together with Eaton and Kortum's = 0:12 yields g = 0:29%, which is signi…cantly lower than the observed rate of growth of productivity in the OECD countries, which is close to g = 1:5%.
One could, of course, calibrate to match the observed growth rate, but this would lead to inconsistent implications for the role of gravity in trade. In particular, bilateral trade volumes would decline too slowly as trade costs increase.
Turning to the gains from trade, these parameters ( = 0:12, = 0:75, and = 0:5)
imply from (6) that the gains from frictionless trade for a country with 1% of the world's total population are 100 0:06 = 1: 3, or 30%. 3 Di¤usion, trade and growth
In this section I extend the previous model to introduce international di¤usion of ideas and make it quantitatively consistent with the observed growth rate and trade volumes. First, I
allow for technological progress in the production of non-tradables. In particular, I assume that 15 The 19 countries included in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. 16 The OLS estimation yields 1= = 8:03 with a standard error of 0:15. The R-squared is 0:06. A simple method of moments estimation of 1= in (7) yields basically the same outcome (see Eaton and Kortum, 2002) . 17 The G5 countries are France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan. Clearly, an increasing share of people engaged in research implies that the system is not in steady state, but the system can still attain a constant growth rate where these formulas are valid (see Jones, 2002) . 18 Note that if i = j for all i; j then with frictionless trade wages are equal across countries, so a country with 1% of the population also has 1% of the world's GDP. For convenience, I used this case to refer to the gains from trade in the Introduction. just as there are ideas that increase the productivity of tradable intermediate goods, there are ideas that increase the productivity of non-tradable consumption goods. I will refer to the …rst type of ideas as "T ideas" and to the second type of ideas as "NT ideas." (I will supress the T and NT labels except when necessary to avoid confusion.) Second, I allow for international di¤usion of both types of ideas. The introduction of NT ideas into the model is necessary to have the model match the observed growth rate, whereas di¤usion of both T and NT ideas is a key mechanism for the gains from openness that I want to explore. Moreover, as will be shown, di¤usion of T ideas helps to make the model better match the trade data.
To model the role of NT ideas, I assume that there is a continuum of non-tradeable consump- The generation and di¤usion of T and NT ideas is assumed to be identical, so I suppress the T and NT labels for now. I assume that the world is composed of two regions: the North and the South. To simplify, I take the South to be a single economy, whereas the North contains n countries. I denote the set of north countries by N and similarly use S to denote the (unitary) set of South countries. I use index i for north countries and the indexes j and l for all countries (i.e., i 2 N and j; l 2 N [ S ).
Only countries in the North generate ideas. Ideas at …rst are "national" (as in the previous section), but then di¤use to other north countries, from which they …nally di¤use to the South.
Thus, there are n + 2 pools of ideas: one pool for each north country, a pool of ideas that have di¤used among the north countries (the "north ideas"), and the pool of ideas that have di¤used to the South. Ideas in the latter pool are available in all countries, so I refer to these ideas as "global ideas."
Following Eaton and Kortum (2006) , I assume that di¤usion is probabilistic, with each idea 19 The assumption that the elasticity of substitution is the same here as in the production of the composite good is made to minimize notation and plays absolutely no role in the results.
having a constant probability of di¤using. Moreover, I assume that ideas …rst di¤use from north countries to a pool of "north ideas" that are accessible to all north countries but not the South, and then ideas di¤use from this pool to a pool of "global ideas" that are available to all countries. To capture this formally, I introduce some additional notation. Let be the rate of di¤usion among countries in the North and let 0 be the rate of di¤usion from the pool of north ideas to the pool of global ideas. Letting N and G be the stocks of ideas in the north and global pools, respectively, then
In steady state the stock of national ideas in north country i is
while the stock of north ideas is
Finally, the stock of global ideas in steady state is
All these stocks of ideas grow at rate g L in steady state.
Equilibrium
Let us …rst focus on consumption goods. Since they are non-tradable then we care only about the best idea available in each country, irrespective of whether they are national ideas or not.
That is, for north country i the cost parameter for a consumption good is associated with the best idea across the pools of national ideas in i, north ideas and global ideas. This implies that the cost parameter in north country i for any consumption good is distributed exponentially with parameter i + N + G . Similarly, the cost parameter for a consumption good in the South is determined by the best global idea and is distributed exponentially with parameter G . In equilibrium, consumption goods are sold at cost, hence the price of consumption good v is Az(v) w p 1 m . The price index for the consumption bundle is then
Since z(v) in north country i is distributed exponentially with parameter i + N + G , then (assuming that 1 + (1 ) > 0 so that the integral above is well de…ned) we have that the price index for the consumption bundle in i is
where C N T (1 + (1 )) 1=(1 ) . The price index for the South is given by a similar expression with i + N + G replaced by G .
Turning to intermediate goods and trade, note that for each good there are n best national ideas (one for each north country), a best north idea, and a best global idea. Recalling that x i (u) denotes the cost parameter for the best national idea in country i for intermediate good u, and using x N (u) and x G (u) to denote the cost parameters associated with the best north and global ideas for this good, respectively, then we can now label intermediate goods by e x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ; x N ; x G ). Consider the di¤erent ways in which a country l could procure a particular good e x. Just as in the previous section, country l could buy this good produced with national ideas from any of the n north countries at minimum cost min i (c i =k li ) x i (recall that i necessarily belongs to N ). But now it can also buy goods produced with di¤used ideas: it can buy goods produced with north ideas from any of the n north countries, and it can buy goods produced with global ideas from any of these countries plus the South. The cost of buying a good produced in country i with the best north idea is (c i =k li ) x N , so the minimum cost of buying a good produced with a north idea is min i (c i =k li ) x N . Similarly, the minimum cost of buying a good produced with a global idea is min j (c j =k lj ) x G (note that this minimization now includes the possibility that the good is produced in the South, j = S).
Letting e c l min j fc j =k lj g and e c N l min i fc i =k li g, then the price of good e x in country l is now
Given the properties of the exponential distribution, l is distributed exponentially with
This parameter determines the price index for intermediate goods in country l. In particular, and analogous to (2), we now have
Wages are determined by the trade-balance conditions, as in (3), but the trade shares are now di¤erent. To determine these shares, note that (c i =k li )
1=
i =^ l is the share of goods which country l can procure most cheaply from i produced with i 0 s best national ideas. The fact that l may also buy north and global goods from i establishes that
To proceed, let M N l arg min i fc i =k li g denote the set of countries from which country l would buy all goods produced with north ideas (i.e. if country l buys a good produced with a north idea, it must be buying this good from i 2 M N l ). The share of goods that country l will actually buy from countries i 2 M N l produced with north ideas is given by e c 
Finally, let M l arg min j fc j =k lj g denote the set of countries from which l would buy all goods produced with global ideas. If the South were the unique member of M l then country l would buy all goods produced with global ideas from the South, and then
In this case (15) would have to be satis…ed with equality. If there are north countries in M l , however, then country l will import from these countries goods produced with national, north and global ideas, and hence
The competitive equilibrium is determined by the vectors p m = (p m1 ; p m2 ; :::; p mn ; p mS ) and w = (w 1 ; w 2 ; :::; w n ; w S ) such that together with the vector (^ 1 ;^ 2 ; :::;^ n ;^ S ) that satis…es equations (12) and (13) and the matrix fD jl ; j; l = 1; 2:::; n; Sg that satis…es (14) (16), the trade-balance conditions (3) are satis…ed.
In steady state wages are constant, so the common growth rate is given by g = _ p l =p l . But equations (12) and (13) imply that p ml declines at rate g L = (using c l = Bw l p 1 ml ), so from (11) we …nd
The growth rate is composed of two terms: the …rst term, ( (5)). This reveals that di¤usion has no e¤ect on steady state growth in this model; as will become clear below, there is only a level e¤ect.
Gains from trade and di¤usion
I now turn to the derivation of the gains from trade and di¤usion of both T and NT ideas.
As in the previous section, I consider the gains from frictionless trade. To do so, I …rst derive the real wage for the case of no trade (with and without di¤usion), and then for the case of frictionless trade with di¤usion. I then compare these wages to establish the gains from trade and di¤usion, and discuss several implications from these results.
No trade
When there is no trade, the price index of intermediate goods in country l, p ml , is given by (13) but with^
where l is the stock of ideas in country l. For each north country i, this stock is composed of ideas originated in i and foreign ideas that have di¤used (i.e., foreign ideas that have become north or global ideas), while for the South this stock is composed entirely of global ideas. Thus, 
From (13) we then get
Note that if there is no di¤usion, then this expression is not well de…ned for the South since in that case l = 0. From (11) we …nally get the real wage for country l, namely
Frictionless trade
Turning to the characterization of the equilibrium under frictionless trade, it is convenient to introduce the notions of "national i goods," "north goods," and "global goods" (this is relevant only for intermediate goods). National i goods are those for which the best idea is a national idea in country i (i.e., x i = arg min fxg); north goods are those for which the best idea is a north idea (i.e., x N = arg min fxg); and global goods are those for which the best idea is a global idea (i.e., x G = arg min fxg).
Thanks to di¤usion and the fact that trade is frictionless, the equilibrium may entail wage equalization across all countries. In this case all countries produce global goods and all north countries produce north goods. If di¤usion is not too strong, then wage di¤erences arise between North and South, and even among north countries. For example, the equilibrium could exhibit an inferior wage in the South, with wage equalization only among north countries. In this equilibrium all north countries produce north goods, and only the South produces global goods.
If North-North di¤usion is weak relative to di¤erences in research intensities across the North then wage di¤erences would arise among north countries. In this case, there would be a group of north countries with the highest research intensities specializing in the production of their "national goods," with wages determined by each country's research intensity (see Kortum, 2002, and Alvarez and Lucas, 2005) , and then a group of north countries with the lowest research intensities sharing a common wage and producing north goods. The wage in the South could be the same as this "low north wage" or it could be lower still. In the later case, all global goods would be produced in the South.
To simplify the exposition, I will focus on the equilibrium with two wage levels: a low wage in the South and a common wage for north countries. This equilibrium is possible even if the research intensity di¤ers among north countries: thanks to di¤usion, north countries with low research intensities can specialize in north goods and attain trade balance in spite of the fact that their stock of national ideas per person is relatively low. The key for this equilibrium con…guration is that all north countries produce north goods. Under frictionless trade, this requires that the unit cost of the input bundle be equal across countries, i.e. c i = Bw i p 1 mi for all i 2 N , so that there is indi¤erence about where to buy north goods. I refer to this condition as the ECN condition. Since under frictionless trade we have p ml = p m for all l, then this condition entails w i = w N for all i.
In equilibrium, country i will at least supply the whole world of national i goods. Using (8), (9), and (10), and letting R i i L i and R N P i R i , the share of national i goods among all goods is i =(
Given the absence of trade costs and the ECN condition, this is also the share of each country's total spending that will be allocated to buying national i goods from country i.
be the average research intensity in the North, then a condition necessary for an equilibrium with wage equalization among north countries is
This inequality ensures that -given the ECN condition -every north country has some resources left over for producing north goods. This requires that i = N be not too high, for otherwise there would be a country that would have so many national goods that it would not be able to satisfy the world demand for its national goods given the ECN condition, and the equilibrium could not take the form that I have postulated here. Note that the condition is relaxed as e increases. This is because a higher implies that a lower share of goods are national goods.
The wage in the South relative to the North can be obtained from the conditions
For the conjectured equilibrium with w S < w N we then need the following condition:
The …rst inequality or the second and third inequalities together imply that the stock of ideas in the South is too low, so w S =w N < 1. 
and from From (11) and (23) we get the inverse of the real wage in north country i,
The corresponding result for the South is
Gains from di¤usion and frictionless trade
The overall gains from openness for north country i can be seen as the increase in the real wage from the case with no trade and no di¤usion to the case with di¤usion under frictionless trade. (24), and using the expressions for i , N and G in equations (8) (10), the gains from openness for north country i are What is the contribution of trade to these gains from openness? The problem in decomposing the overal gains from openness into the contributions of trade and di¤usion (of T ideas) is that these two channels are substitutes, in the sense that if one is present then the other one is less important. To see this, it is best to start with an extreme case in which trade and di¤usion of T ideas among north countries are perfect substitutes. Consider the case in which i = for all i (symmetry) and again let ! 1 (with 0 not too low). Assume also that = 0 (no NT ideas) to simplify the exposition. Recall that the stock of ideas originated in country i is R i =g L . Thus, if all countries shut down di¤usion it is easy to show that the real wage under frictionless trade in country i is given by
From (19) with
On the other hand, ! 1 implies that for all i we have i + N + G ! R N =g L , so using (19) we see that under autarky but with di¤usion the real wage is also given by (27). Thus, in this extreme case, the contribution of di¤usion is zero when there is trade, and the contribution of trade is zero when there is di¤usion. The general result under normal conditions (i.e., trade is costly and di¤usion is …nite) is that trade and di¤usion are substitutes in the sense that if there is di¤usion (trade) then the gains from trade (di¤usion) are lower than if di¤usion (trade) is not present. Intuitively, imports allow a country to bene…t from foreign ideas that
have not yet di¤used, and di¤usion allows a country to bene…t from foreign ideas even without trade; di¤usion acts as a substitute for trade in the international exchange of ideas among north countries. Another way to state this is that shutting down trade leads a country to rely more on di¤usion and this attenuates the resulting losses.
This result implies that it is to some extent arbitrary to decompose the overall gains from openness into separate contributions of trade and di¤usion. But it is still meaningful to ask how a country would lose by shutting down trade. Equivalently, we can ask how a country gains by going from a case with di¤usion and autarky to a case with di¤usion and frictionless trade. The result can then be compared to the calculated gains from trade in a model without di¤usion (as in Section 2) and to the overall gains from openness. This entails comparing (19) with i = i + N + G to (24), which yields (again, using (8) (10))
Countries with a lower share of worldwide research gain more from trade. Moreover, the gains from trade for north countries are increasing in w N =w S , as this reduces their relative cost of procuring global goods. This implies that an increase in the size of the South enlarges the gains from trade for the North. This is a standard terms of trade e¤ect. We can now explore further the implications of di¤usion for the gains from trade by studying the impact of on GT i . Consider …rst the case in which wages are equalized between North and South. The result that trade and di¤usion are substitutes can be appreciated clearly in this case by noting from (28) (with w N =w S = 1) that GT i decreases with . Another way to see this is to note from the …rst term of (26) that the joint gains from trade and di¤usion of T ideas among north countries are r
(1 )= i , which does not depend on . Since the real wage in the North increases under autarky with , then necessarily GT i will decrease with .
Consider now the case in which there is no wage equalization between North and South.
Again, there are two opposite e¤ects, because an increase in lowers the gains from NorthNorth trade but -if is su¢ ciently small -it increases the North's gains from trading with the South. Thus, with no wage equalization between North and South, it is conceivable that higher North-North di¤usion leads to higher gains from trade in north countries.
Turning now to the gains from trade for the South (the gains from openness are not well de…ned because under isolation the stock of ideas in the South is zero, implying zero income). This is given by
If w S = w N then GT S is decreasing in both and 0 , implying that trade and di¤usion are substitutes for the South. In the general case, we again have con ‡icting e¤ects: on the one 20 This just entails di¤erentiating the expression for GT i w.r.t. 0 and noting that this derivative is positive for 0 = 0 and negative for 0 close to the value at which wages are equalized (which exists as long as > g L L S =L N ). By continuity, there exists a value of 0 at which the derivative of GT i w.r.t. hand, di¤usion implies that the South has less to gain from the North because in a sense it already has many of the North's technologies, but on the other hand higher di¤usion implies an improvement in the terms of trade for the South, leading to higher gains from trade with north countries. It is easy to show that GT S behaves like an inverted U with respect to either and 0 : when di¤usion is low, the terms of trade e¤ect dominates, whereas for high di¤usion the substitution e¤ect dominates.
Calibration
To explore the quantitative implications of the model, I need to choose values for the parameters , , , , and 0 . I also need to choose a reasonable value for L N =L S , as this pins down the relative wage w N =w S , which is necessary to determine the gains from trade. Again, I follow Alvarez and Lucas (2005) and set = 0:75, and = 0:5. To assign a value to I use a procedure that is similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002) , but amended to account for the e¤ect of di¤usion.
In particular, I assume that trade among north countries can be seen as an equilibrium outcome of the model presented in the previous section (with trade costs) for the particular case in which there is no trade among north countries in north goods. That is, I think of the trade data as coming from the equilibrium of the model for a set of research intensities and trade costs so that each north country satis…es its own demand for north goods with domestic production. I refer to this as the NTNG condition.
Recalling the de…nition e c N l = min i fc i =k li g, the NTNG condition implies that e c N i = c i for all i. One case in which the NTNG condition is satis…ed entails a common research intensity across north countries. To gain some intuition for this result, consider the case of frictionless trade. With a common research intensity in the North, the absence of trade costs implies that in equilibrium all north countries have the same wage and the same unit cost for the input bundle, i.e. c i = c j for all i; j 2 N . In turn, this implies that in equilibrium one can have every north country satisfy its own demand for north goods. If trade costs are positive, then a fortiori the NTNG condition will be satis…ed. In the Appendix I prove this result for parameters and that satisfy 1= > (1 )= (a condition satis…ed in the calibration below) under common research intensities for the case in which there is no di¤usion to the South (i.e., 0 = 0). In future work I intend to extend this result for the case of a positive small 0 .
The assumption of a common research intensity across north countries is only necessary for the NTNG condition to be satis…ed for any structure of trade costs k ij . Alternatively, one could assume a simple structure of trade costs with k = k ij for all i; j, and then …nd the upper bound k( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n ) such that if k k( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n ) then the NTNG condition to is satis…ed given a vector of research intensities ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n ). Clearly such an upper bound for k exists since the NTNG condition is satis…ed for k close to zero (see Appendix).
I now assume that research intensities are su¢ ciently similar that given the presence of trade costs the NTNG condition is satis…ed. Although clearly this is not an appropriate characterization for the whole world, it is a reasonable assumption to characterize trade among the richest countries. I also assume that e c l min j fc j =k lj g = c S =k lS for all l, so that the South produces all global goods. Applying the equilibrium characterization derived in the previous section to the case with e c 
Trade shares are given by D ij = e ij = e i . The relationship between normalized import shares (D ij =D jj ) and trade costs (p mj =p mi k ij ) can now be shown to be (in logs)
This is similar to the (normalized) gravity equation in (7) except that now there are sourcecountry …xed e¤ects. These e¤ects are more important for small countries (i.e., m ij is more negative when R N =R j is higher) because in such countries an important part of domestic production is related to north goods, which are not exported to other north countries. This decreases the imports by any country from small countries in relation to (or normalized by) those countries'domestic purchases.
Using the same data on trade volumes and trade costs as Eaton and Kortum (2002) , and 1990
R&D employment as a proxy for aggregate research levels R j and R N in (32), I estimated e and from this equation using non-linear least squares among 19 OECD countries and g L = 0:048.
Both parameters are precisely estimated. what should be pinning down e in the estimation. To see whether this is indeed the case, I ran a linear regression of m ij on ij with source-country dummies and compared the exponential of the (negative of the) estimated coe¢ cients for the dummies (which I denote z j ) with R N =R j .
As shown in Figure 2 , there is clear positive relationship between these two variables. 22 This suggests that smaller countries do have lower normalized exports, and that the estimated e in the NLS procedure above is capturing this relationship. The higher value of helps the model better match the observed growth rate even with no technological progress for consumption goods: imposing = 0 in (17) and using = 0:75, = 0:5 and g L = 4:8%, the implied growth rate would now be g = 0:53% rather than 21 These are robust standard errors. There are 342 observations, and the R-squared is 0:2. The same regression but with no intercept -as in the case of no di¤usion -yields an R-squared of 0:06, whereas a simple OLS regression with an intercept yields an R-squared of 0:16.
22 A linear regression of z j on R N =R j yields an estimated slope coe¢ cient of 0:26 with a s.e. of 0:09. The outlier is Australia: this country's high z means that it has low normalized exports -a characteristic of small countries (high R N =R j ) -in spite of being a large country as measured by a low R N =R j . g = 0:29% obtained in the model without di¤usion. But this is still signi…cantly below the observed g = 1:5%. I now set to match this growth rate in (17). This yields = 0:2. It is reassuring to note that this value for is very close to the value for estimated above from an entirely di¤erent procedure.
The last step is to calibrate and 0 . Eaton and Kortum (1999) calculate di¤usion lags from international patent data and …nd an average mean di¤usion lag of ten years among the …ve leading economies. This may signi…cantly understate the di¤usion lag for all ideas conducive to trade, however, because only a small subset of technologies are patented and it is reasonable to expect that those technologies are precisely the ones that are likely to di¤use rapidly. An important implication is that wages become equalized across North and South for 0:024. In this case, the North would produce some global goods, which is not consistent with the equilibrium that I considered for the calibration of and e , where I assumed that all global 23 See for instance Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) . 24 The reader may worry about the implication of low rates of di¤usion for the existence of national scale e¤ects. That is, one could expect that if is low then small countries would be less productive than large ones because of a smaller stock of ideas. Although trade would greatly reduce such scale e¤ects for T ideas, this would not help for NT ideas. But this is only a problem if one assumes that consumption goods are tradable across all points within a country. A more reasonable assumption is that such goods are non-tradable across national subregions. Under these conditions scale e¤ects would not arise at the national level.
25 This is the share of worldwide GDP accounted for by the 19 OECD countries used by Eaton and Kortum (2002) in their estimation of . The GDP data comes from the WDI cdRom, average 1994-2000. 
Gains from trade and di¤usion: quantitative results
I now use the parameters calibrated in the previous section to compute values for the gains from openness and the gains from trade for a country that does 1% of the world's total research.
I then generalize to countries with di¤erent shares of world research.
Applying the formula in (26) yields gains from openness for a country with r i = 1% that range between 206% to 240% (i.e., GO i 2 [3:06; 3:4]) as increases from 0:01 to 0:024. Figure   4 shows these gains (GO) as well as the …rst and third terms of GO i in (26) -the second term is not shown because it too small relative to the other terms in the …gure. The …rst term, GO1, measures the gains from trade and di¤usion of T ideas between north countries, whereas the third term, GO3, measures these countries'gains from di¤usion of NT ideas. The overall gains from openness are large relative to the gains from openness in the model without di¤usion (see Section 2). Partly, this is a result of the gains from di¤usion of NT ideas (GO3), which ranges from 80% to 104% as increases from 0:01 to 0:024. But this also comes from the increase in the estimated value of when di¤usion is allowed into the model, as can be veri…ed by noting that GO1 increases from 1: 32 to 1: 66 as increases from 0:12 to 0:22. What is the role of trade in generating these gains? Applying (28) we …nd that the gains from trade for a country with r i = 1% range from 23:7% to 13% as increases from 0:01 to 0:024, as illustrated in Figure 5 . These gains seem small compared to the large overall gains from openness calculated above. They are also smaller than the gains from trade that would arise in a model without di¤usion. In this case, and with symmetric research intensities (i.e., i = for all i), then GT i = 1: 66. An important implication is that although di¤usion brings about gains from trade with the South, these extra gains are dominated by the substitutative property between North-North trade and di¤usion; in other words, although in theory trade and di¤usion could be complements via trade with the South, this is not the case for the set of parameters considered here.
26
The previous calculations have been made for the case of r i = 1%. 27 Again, the second term of GT i in (26) -which corresponds to the gains from North-South trade -is not plotted because it is too small relative to GO1 and GO3 (GO2 = 1:007 for any r i ). 
Conclusion
Countries bene…t from openness to the rest of the world in many di¤erent ways. Trade and di¤usion are surely two of the most important channels for the realization of these bene…ts.
Building on Kortum (2001, 2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2005) One concern is that the analysis implicitly assumes that the ‡ow of ideas is independent of the volume of trade. Perhaps trade has a much larger role precisely through a positive e¤ect on di¤usion. This could happen through several channels, such as ‡ows of ideas arising from the interaction between nationals and foreigners via trade, the competitive pressure from imports inducing domestic …rms to engage in faster technology adoption, or complementarities between foreign technologies and foreign inputs. 28 There is a large empirical literature exploring the signi…cance of these and similar mechanisms through which trade may induce productivity growth in domestic …rms. 29 This seems like an important topic for future research.
A limitation of the model concerns the way in which di¤usion is captured. There are at least three speci…c tasks ahead. First, assuming simultaneous di¤usion, so that national ideas become available in all rich countries and then globally, is clearly unrealistic. It seems important to model di¤usion according to the qualitative and hopefully quantitative features found in the data (see for example Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 1999 , Keller, 2002 , and Comin et. al. 2006 ) and explore the implications of this for growth and trade.
Second, FDI is surely one mechanism through which di¤usion takes place. Ramondo (2006) has already shown a way to model FDI within the Eaton and Kortum framework when there is no trade. The next step is to have a model with trade, FDI and (pure) di¤usion and quantify the gains from each of these channels separately. Including migration into such a model would be another worthwhile step. 28 We tend to see countries that are closed to trade also being closed to foreign ideas; think of North Korea. But this empirical association between trade and di¤usion does not imply any causal role for trade in accelerating di¤usion.
29 See for instance Rhee et. al. (1984) , Aitken et. al. (1997 ), Clerides et. al. (1998 , Bernard and Jensen (1999) , Hallward-Driemeier et. al. (2002), and Tybout (2003) .
Finally, this paper has ignored the importance of di¤erences across countries in technology adoption. One conjecture that would be interesting to explore is that countries with lower rates of technology adoption have less to gain from di¤usion and more to gain from trade, with lower overall gains from openness.
A …nal remark concerns the assumption that research e¤orts are exogenous. How would the results change if this assumption were relaxed? In the simplest model with no di¤usion of T ideas, as in Eaton and Kortum (2001) , trade does not a¤ect countries'research intensity (i.e., the share of the labor force devoted to research). The reason for this is the standard one that although trade expands the market for ideas, it also increases competition, and these two e¤ects exactly balance out. This implies that, to a …rst approximation, the gains from trade would not be a¤ected by having endogenous research e¤orts. Something similar happens with the gains from di¤usion. To see this, consider the extreme case in which di¤usion is instantaneous (no frictions to the international di¤usion of ideas, i.e. ; 0 ! 1) and research productivities are equal across north countries (i.e., i = all i). Shutting down di¤usion would imply larger returns to ideas in the home market, but would prevent the exploitation of ideas in foreign markets. As shown in Eaton and Kortum (2006) , these two e¤ects exactly cancel out, so di¤usion has no e¤ect on innovation. This discussion suggests that the results obtained here with exogenous research e¤orts would not be signi…cantly a¤ected by the extension to endogenous research. Still, a thorough analysis of this issue seems worthwile, and is left for future research.
We have the following system of equations 
together with c i = Bw i p 1 mi . 30 Here i belongs to f1; 2; :::; Ig, , b, , B, i , N , a il are positive parameters, < 1, a il 1, a il = a li , a il satis…es the triangular inequality (a il a ij a jl for all i; j; l), and w i , c i , and p mi are positive unknowns. Moreover, b > (1 )= . I will refer to this system of equations as simply the "system." The task is to show that if (p m ; w) is a solution to the system then it satis…es NTC.
In proving the Proposition, the following property of prices p mi will be useful p mi p mj =k ij for all i; j I refer to this as the NTP condition. The following lemma establishes that this condition is satis…ed.
Lemma 1 If (p m ; w) is a solution to the system then it satis…es condition NTP.
Proof. I …rst establish that NTC implies NTP. To do so, …rst note that p mi < p mj =k ij is equivalent to a ij p 
But from (35) we see that It is straightforward to extend the existence proof of Alvarez and Lucas (2006) for the case with N = 0 to the present case with N > 0, so I omit this. Also, they show that a property of any solution is that w i ; p mi ; c i > 0 for all i, and this also extends easily to the present case. I will use this property below. x i =z i = P l l a il x l P l l a il z l Note that property E is simply that x i =z i = x j =z j for all i; j. To prove property E, let h il l a il , let H = fh ij g, and let P l h il x l = e x i and P l h il z l = e z i . Then we can write the previous expression as
This also implies that z i = i x i and e z i = i e x i . In matrix notation we have e x 0 = Hx 0 and e z 0 = Hz 0 . Let j = arg maxf j g and let D be the IxI matrix that has i on the i th term of the diagonal, with the rest of elements equal to zero. Multiplying the …rst of this equalities by j we get j e x 0 = H j x 0 . Morever, using z i = i x i and e z i = i e x i , the second equality (i.e., 
Letting V be the matrix with i j on the i th diagonal element, with every other entry equal to zero, then (40) implies V e x = HV x 0 . The j th row of this expression implies
If h il > 0 for all i; l and x l > 0 for all l, then since ( l j ) 0 for all l; j, then this can be true only if l = j for all l; j. This establishes property E. This completes the proof of the Proposition. In the rest of this Appendix I consider the case in which k ij = k for all i; j but i 6 = j and derive an upper bound for k such that NTC holds. The system can now be written as
Plugging the …rst equation into the second and rearranging yields after some simpli…cations 
then NTC is satis…ed.
